We have generally become used to the idea that ethnographers are a part of what they study. They live in the community they study and participate in the events and (ideally) in the social and cultural processes which they analyze and interpret. They cannot stand either theoretically or methodologically outside what they study -even though we do not perhaps all of us always manage to follow through with the implications of this condition.
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INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS IN BALUCHISTAN: WESTERN AND INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES ON ECOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
Brian Spooner
We have generally become used to the idea that ethnographers are a part of what they study. They live in the community they study and participate in the events and (ideally) in the social and cultural processes which they analyze and interpret. They cannot stand either theoretically or method ologically outside what they study -even though we do not perhaps all of us always manage to follow through with the implications of this con dition.
The evolutionary ecologist knows implicitly that his professional ac tivity, like all other human activity, takes place within the evolutionary process. But this orientation towards his subject matter tends to be very different from that of the ethnographer. Other investigators, and particu larly economists and development planners, study unequivocally from without -they translate the laboratory-objectivity tradition of Western scientific method into the field. The growing emphasis on popular partic ipation in development planning and implementation draws attention to these differences of orientation. In this chapter a case from Baluchistan will illustrate the significance of the difference.
ECOLOGY AND ETHNOGRAPHY
We use the word "ecology" in two senses. It was coined to denote the scientific study (-logia) of "household" (oiko-) relations in and between communities, in and between biological populations, and between them and their physical environment. It has come to be used also for sets of those relations themselves. We often confuse these two meanings.
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Ecology as a type of study has been pursued in various paradigms, most particularly a systemic "ecosystems" paradigm, and (more commonly in recent years) an evolutionary pamdigm. In either of these paradignls it has been understood mainly as a natural scicnce, deriving historically from biology, and using natural-science assumptions and models. Where social scientists have talkcd ecologycalling it cultural ecology, human ecology, or anthropological ecologyin their studies of human activities in relation to their natural mauix, they have explicitly borrowed concepts from biological ecology, and have talked in terms of adaptation, niche, etc. They have been conccmcd with the problem of explaining how human activities and experience are caused, conditioned, or affected by natural processes and conditions, rather than the other way round. Having no concepts that apply to both sides of the equation, physical-biological and human-cultural, they have tried applying concepts borrowed from the biological side.' Whether they begin from systemic or evolutionary assumptions, they run into similar problems: on the one hand we have not yet found a way to relate ethnographic data to evolutionary models; on the other, although for a time we had great hopes for systemic models of society, we have become disillusioned with thern.
For this reason a serious dilemma underlies the attempts of biological ecologists, development planners, and anthropologists to work together in specific projects. This dilemma vitiates most ecologically oriented work related to devclopment. (It is worth noting that in the past it has also had the effect of separating ecological anlhropologists theoretically froin their colleagues.) The dilemma is rarely faced. Whatever the focus of their work, biological ecologists tcnd implicitly to include human activity and its effects in their studics. However, as biologists they cannot treat human activity on the same lcvcl as thc activity of other species, because as fellow human beings thcy impute values and intentions to it. Perhaps partly for this reason, thcy tcnd to ucat it as intrusive.
Theie is good reason for them to treat human activity as intrusive. Theorganization of human activity commonly transcends the boundaries of ecosy!;tems or habitats, and cannot thcrcfore be usefully analyzed in terns of the ecologists' universe of study. AIlhough human societies and cultures may be products of biological evolution, social and cultural processes do not fit into ecological systcms or "communities". But ecologists' reasons for treating human activity as invusivc are more complicated than this, and not always entircly explicit: ~f they can manage to exclude it, there is nothing to prevent thcm from formulating their prob-
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lems, hypotheses, methods, and solutions with the objectivity that is de rigeur in the Western scientific tradition. If they admit the presence of human activity on a level with other (nonhuman) activities, they find themselves in the position of having to deal with members of their own species (if not their own actual "population" or "community"), with whom, unlike the members of other species in their universe, they are unavoidably related (in the sense that their objcctivity is compromised) by differences of interests and valuesessentially, that is, by a political and moral (rather than a scientific) relationship (cf. Tucker 1977): They avoid this problem by treating all human activity as extraneous to the ecosystem. By thus reserving scientific objectivity for themselves they deftly condemn as beyond the pale all human opinion that differs from theirs.
Natural scientists are untrained lo deal scientifically with questions of politics and morals. Social scientists are prepared for questions of politics and morals, but with rare exceptions do not adequately understand ecology. Not even those rare exceptions have yet proposed how to integrate the essential positivist objectivization of ecological science (which sees science as extra-cultural and absolute) with the semitic approaches of sccial science (which see scientific arguments, like all other arguments, as socially an'd culturally conditioned or filtered), in order to arrive at a somewhat humbler and more practical scientific ecology that would not treat human activity as intrusive. Ignoring the problem has led many (including many social scientists) to the gcncial conviction that we know what all human beings should think and do in relation to the productivity of the renewable natural resources to which they have access, k p e c t i v e of the legitimate interests of other people in those resources.
To return to the initial distinction between objcctive ecology and ecological analysis: unlike ecological reality, ecological analysis is (like ethnographic description) not absolute but relative; it is relative to the social and cultural experience of the scientist. Although the ecologists' situation is far less obvious, they are in fact as much a part of what they are studying as are ethnographers of what they are studying. The identity of Western (as well as non-Western but Western-trained) ecologists derives from their place in their own society, and thcir society's position in the world, as well as from ideas from the cultural rcpcrtoire of their society which presently include (for example) positive thoughts about stewards of nature ("we are responsible to God and to future gcncrations for the condition of the natural world) and negative thoughts about the desuuctiveness of the "frontier mentality" %there will always be more out there for us to exploit to our advantage").
It is not too difficult to grasp and to explain the possibility of cultural variation in ecological orientation. We have become accustomed to the idea that different people from different cultml backgrounds have different values and consequently are likely to have different perceptions of nature and of their relation to i t But the ability to appreciate social differences seems to lie deeper in our cultural consciousness. Though we recognize them instinctively, we repress them, or at best proceed on the assumption that hey are artificial and w i l y overcome, whereas in fact the more we seek to overcome them, the more they control our daily lives. Our feelings towards nature and the natural environment turn out to be a reflection of the way we relate to other pwple. Our ecological values are to a large extent a function of our social values.
This social dimension of ecology obscures our view of development problems. It is therefore on social variation in relation to territory and natural resources hat I shall focus in the remainder of this chapter.
ECOLOGY AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
Social variables have to do with interests. Interests relate to individuals and to groups. In some cases (e$pccially in the Wcst) individual interests tend to take priority over group intcrests. In other cases (especially in some tribal societies -pace Hardin) group intcrcsts may take precedence over individual interests. Every ecological issue involves a range of different interests, representing conflict bctwccn individuals within a group, and between groups, between insiders, and bctwcen insiders and outsider!!.
The classic case of an ecological issue betwecn insiders and outsiders is the issue between "us" and "them", bctwecn the ecologist-consultant and the indigenous community. Mary Douglas, who has done more than anyone to scnsiti7.*: us to the social mainspring of human experience, p~~t s it this way: Unlike tribal society, we have the chance of self-awareness. Because we can set our own view in a general phcnomenological ~~rspective, just because we can compare our beliefs with theirs, we have an extra dimension of responsibility. Self knowledge is a great burdcn ).
If we are to acknowledge the burden that Douglas identifies, we must take account of the fact that statements about ecology are not just right or wrong. Apart from being objcctivcly right or wrong, they have Insides and Oufsiders in Baluchistan different meanings, more or less significant, according to whether one is a member of the ecological community in question or not, and (if one is a member) according to the particular position in that community that one occupies. Both the habitat and the ecological future look very different according to whether one is a hunter in a small closely knit society; or a d~y-farmer, a pastoralist, or an inigator in a society that may also include people with different resource interests; or a stccl worker in a modern complex society, where one is not committed to a particular occupation or a particular relationship to the natural environment, but may (~r h a p s un-&nsciously) feel locked into a particular cconomic class. just as there is more than one recognized valid intcrprctation of a modern industrial economy (the differences correlate with different political ideas about the ideal economy), so the ecosystcm may look vcry different according to the niche one occupies withinor outsidc it.
For comparison let us imagine ourselves in Disneyland. Take the case of a gazellc in an open steppe ecosystcm. Although everything is indeed connected toeverything else (ct Cornmoncr 1971:29) , the survival interests of grasses and forbs, shrubs, hcrbivores, and predators are obviously in conflict. The ecologist stands outsidc the systcm but bases his research design implicitly on certain intcrrclatcd assumptions about prcductivity and diversity. However objective his rescarch design, the ecologist is led by his assumptions to discriminate against the interests of individual creatures in favor of the survival of what he perceives as "the system". The survival of the system may, of course, be in the long-term best interests of the totality. It is definitely not, however, in the best interests of all the component specics, lct alone of all the living individuals, some of whom will inevitably sooner or later fall prey to predators. A reduction in the number of predators would, thcreforc, hc in the best interests of some at least of the living hcrbivores. Similarly, a reduction in the number of herbivores would be in the bcst intcrcsts of many living plants.
If a gazelle could produce a study of the samc ecosystem, we might expect the results to diffcr from those of the ccologist, inasmuch as they would, as a matter of course, be based on different values, which would derive from a different social situation. The gazelle's assumptions would of course not be disinterested. A membcr of thc systcm, such as the gazelle, whose personal interests are at stake, would argue for his own survival first. But what about the ecologist? The ecologist can argue in terms of the survival of species and of thc systcm, because survival on that level suits his own social valucs bcst. Both arguments may be equally objective and scientific, but diffcr on grounds of morals and per-sonal interest, which are socially relative. The conflict bctwecn them is always in the end resolved politically, as a function of the difference in power of the individuals or the communitics or the populations in question (cf. Spooner 1982a:7). Scxial scientisls will also recognize here the familiar problem of the actual individual versus the abstract society. However, the issue of the conflict of interest bctwcen the cheetah, the gazelle, and the shrub is introduced in order to clarify the difference of interests between the Western-trained ecologist and the nomad, the horticulturalist, or the irrigator, each in relation to (not an ecosystem, but) all the other human, biological, and physical factors that impinge on their lives. A particular case from the Third World will show the significance of this argument for problems of dcvclopmcnt (standard of living) and ecology (habitat and natural resources).
A CASE STUDY FROM BALUCHISTAN
Baluchistan is the western province of Pakistan. The name comes from the Baluch, who comprise the majority of the population throughout most of the province, as wel: as in the neighboring province of Iran and the adjoining part of southern Afghanistan. The total population is estimated tentatively at four million. In all three countries thc territory is arid and poor, and has remained for many centuries in comparative isolation from the major economic and political centers of the region. Baluch idcntity is symbolized in their language and oral literature and code of honour. Otherwi?e they are a heterogeneous collection of tribes of various origins, and the land they inhabit varies from high plateau with cold winters td subtropical coastal lowlands. They live by a mixture of dry and inigated agriculture and pastoralism. Community organization varies between extremes of highly stratified villages (often in the past dominated by strong forts) and small egalitarian nomadic groups.
In Makran, the southwestern division of the province of Baluchistan in Western Pakistan, and across the border in Iran, the nomadic pastoralists play a particularly significant social role. Their continued activity provides a communications network among the scttlcd village communities and symbolizes for those communities the values that support waditional Baluch identity. They contribute significantly, that is, to both the logistics and the morale that arc essential to the continued viability of Baluch society in the area. Unfortunately, these variables do not show up in either economic or ecological analysis.
Nomads are important for the local economy, both for what they produce and as a source of seasonal labor. They bring milk products to the local market, and they supply the necessary labor for the date harvest in the villagesthe most important event in the traditional agricultural cycle, which coincides in late summer with the slack season in the pastoral cycle. They are also agricultural producers themselves. Much of the subsistence-crop production of the area depends on unpredictable river flow and ~n o f f , which only the nomads know how to use. Small pockets of soil scattered throughout the area produce crops when a downpour happens to bring water byif a nomad is there to channel and apply it.
Although no one in the towns wants to live that life anymore, the idea of it remains an important cultural value: nomadic life is still thought of as the genuine Baluch life, which embodies the authentic Baluch virtues of honesty, loyalty, faith, hospitality, asylum for refugees, and so on.
There are no reliable figures to indicate how many of the Makran population of some 230,000 are now nomadic, nor how many of those who are nomads by socialization still spend most of the year in tents or other temporary dwellings with their families and flocks ralher than taking one of the modem options of wage labor in the (until recently) booming Gulf Emirates, or wage labor in towns outside the province. We may estimate, conservatively, over 50,000.
The significance of the nomads for the future development of Makran far outweighs their numbcrs or their economic contribution. They are the only people who use or are ever likely to use some 90 percent of the territory of Makran. Without them the greater pan of the population would be marooned in isolated oases, which on their own do not have the resources to be economically indcpendent, and with increasing dependence on outside subsidies would gradually lose population to more attractive opportunities outside the province. With the nomads, the Baluch population as a whole forms an interdependent social and cultural, as well as economic and political, network covering the whole of the area. As long as the nomads are there, the whole of the area continues to be inhabited by people who consider it to be their territory. If the nomads leave, the settled population will see itself simply as an economically disadvanlaged appendage of the national economy. As long as they remain, the total population shares a conception of ethnic provincial autonomy.
The nomads depend on the primary productivity of the semi-desert and desen areas which cover the greater pan of the territory. Traditionally they make no improvement in either the pasture or the watering resources. Based on comparison with other areas of similar climate and soils, ecologists evaluate most of this rangeland as severely degraded. Their evallmtion is made without reference to the fact that the Baluch continue to make a living out of it, and without the possibility of direct comparison with earlier data. It is an outsider's evaluation, which focuses on the vegetation rather than on the evolving proccss of intcraction between the vegetation and the pastonlists.
Pastoral activity is an essential component of the Baluch economy, and it contxibutes significantly to the social intcraction and the culture of the province. Range science condemns Baluch pastoral practice. But no one has yet shown how the principles of range science might be integrated with the social conditions of this type of situation. The national economy 1:s inauding more and more into the l~fe of the area, helped by programs financed by USAID. A major consequcncc of these programs is increasing dependence of the population on the nat~onal and regional economies. For the time being, howevcr, the pastoralist sees h~s main interests in continued exploitation of thc range, of localized runoff, and of the socio-economic resources of the scattcrcd settlcments of the area. The farmers in the seulements depend both on the pastordlists and on the outside econorny. Loss of the pastoralists would significantly reduce the viability of most of the settlcments. Thc pastoralists can use hclp, but what they need is not enforced improvement of their range through enforcement of Western range science principles, but defense against the effects of the national economy. The bcst delcnse would probably be in the form of managenlent by government of the tcnns of mdc, manipulating prices in such a way as to reinforce local valucs, instead of subverting them.
Western range ecology, as its namc implics, starts with the range. The range scientist is the self-designated steward of thc plant communities of the Baluch's range. According to h e prmnciplcs of this science, no more herbivores should be allowcd onto the range than can graze without degrading its plant communitics. The pastoralist, on the other hand, sees range, domrsticated animals, and people in lntcrdcpendcnt interaction. It would probably not be too much of an oversimplification to characterize this view as one that would emphasize the convenience of the family group in the context of its social maulx. The nomad's first priority is to avoid disruption of his social relations. If this would mean reduction of the productivity of the range for future generations, that is of secondary importance. In these times of rapid change, who knows what future generations will need?
However, there is evidence to suggest that the range has remained in its current "degraded state for a long time, over a century (Hughes-Buller and Minchin 1906-1907) , and we do not have convincing evi-
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dence that current trends are adverse. Unforlunatcly, no one will finance the studies that would be necessary to establish what the rends are. Such studieswhich would construct an insider's ecologywould need to focus on interactions of pastoral technology, animal behavior, and plant communities over a period of time (cf. Nycrges 1982) .
COMPARABLE CASES
Such cases of insidcr's ecology are beginning to appcar. In Africa pastoralists have the reputation of secking to maximize numbers of animals. Recent work by Sandford (1982 and in press) has providcd a rational basis for this emphasis in range-science terms by synthesizing accumulated existing information on what might be called indigenous range-manage ment practices. Cossins (in press), using data gathcred by ILCA (International Livestock Centre for Africa) research tcams, has demonstrated that many pastoral systems in sub-Saharan Africa are also in fact more efficient in terms of productivity pcr hectare than ranching systems in either developing or developed countries. But as Legcsse (in press) has shown in his study in northern Kenya, in order to understand what is going on ecologically among the Boran and the Gabra pastoralists, it is necessary to study the inter-dependence of their two sets of activities.
What we need more than anything else, however, is some reconstruction of what has actually happencd in the relationship bccween pastoralists and their resources over a significant period of time. Cassanelli is probably the first historian to work in the historical ccology of pastoralists. He brings the skills of an historian to bwr on the problem, without the biases of either the ecologist or the anihropologist (in prcss).
In each of these cases there are obviously several different ways of defining the universe of refcrencecach producing different rcsults.
The Western ecologist wants primary productivity at the expense (if necessary) of current livelihood -on the assumption that we are othcnvise sacrificing the livelihood of future generations to the interest of the living, and that we should not do that. The Baluch pastoralist sees market centers and agriculture as a resourcc on a levcl with the range. He wants more in rciurn for his product, but his first priority is the security of his social life. Else he will think of leaving his niche. The range ecologist considers that the local range, and therefore also the global rcsource base, would be bettcr off if the pastoralist would leave his niche. The Baluch farmer sees the nomads as a resource. He wants to kccp them where they are; otherwise only economic subsidies will kecp him where he is.
It would bc easy to add cxamplcs of othcr forms of land use. A similar case could bc made in thc much morc complcx situation of the Punjabi irrigator (Spooncr 1984b:28-39) . But pcrhaps morc inlcrcsting hcrc is the case of the Susu in northwcstcrn Sierra Lconc (Nycrgcs 1985) . Susu swiddcncrs do not havc enough labor to producc an adcqualc fwd supply, though shortage of labor lcads thcm to clcar plots inadcquakly, with the result hat thc degradation of the forcst procccds at a slowcr pace than might othcnvise bc thc case; rccurrcnt famine kccps population and thc labor forcc down; thcy cannot intcnsify 1 . 0 producc morc food, because of insufficient labor: thcy cannot rcducc labor inputs and dc-intensify to fit labor availability, bccausc thcy darc not risk lower production of food. But wc cannot hclp thcm, bccausc if wc inlroducc labor or technology from outsidc, what we introduce will havc a highcr valuc for chcm than the local rcsourccs and they will dcgradc faster and havc lcss intcrcst in conserving local rcsourccs.
Since pcoplc do not fit casily into wosystcrnic frames of rcfcrcncc, the shift from a systcmic to an evolutionary paradigm in ecology has hclpcd us to dcvclop ways of incorporaling local intcrcsts and points or vicw into ecological analysis. Howcvcr, in casc I may havc appcarcd to arguc that social relativism is morc imporlilnt than global survival, lct me in concluding emphasize [hat this is not my vicw. As I slatcd at lhc bcginning, ec:ology is rwl; but ccological analysis dcrivcs from a particular social and cultural (and pcrhaps cvcn ideological) position. To return to the Bambi-likc examplc: without human inlcrvcntion thc gazcllc population would probably ncvcr cxpand to thc point whcrc it disrupts thc cco-"syslcm". Malthusian factors would cakc carc or thcm first. But human populations, having culturc, arc not always rcstrictcd by Malthusian pressures. On thc contrary, thcy are often able to act out thc scenarios of Marx and Boscrup, and havc done so periodically from thc Neolithic up to thc G m n Revolution.
Furthcnnorc, human bcings, having culturc, havc rights -not only human rights but civil rights. Wc scicntists and consulmts lcarn our morality in two diffcrcnt arcnas. Whcn wc mix thctn wc do so as amatcurs. If wc smnd outsidc thc ccosystcm (as wc do in thc casc of thc gm.cllc and the Baluch) we artificially kccp morality out of the discussion. In fact, howcvcr, cvcry wological qucstion Lhat involvcs human activity is not only an ccological qucstion, but also both a moral qucstion and a political qucstion. Dcvclopincnt has tcndcd to ignore the political and moral dimensions of ccological (among othcr) problcms, and has conccntrauxl on thc scientific and tcchnological solution of thc problcm qua objcctificd ccological problcm only. In the long tcrm it cannot bc donc. The ecological dimension of ihc problcm will be resolved only as part of a comprchcnsivc resolution of thc whole problcm, including its moral and political dirncnsions. Thc primary produciivily of thc range lands of Baluchislan must be takcn care of not by ecologists but by politicians, using ecological among oihcr information, at the lcvcl of national planning, adjusting ihc terms of wade so as to rcinforcc local values insofar as lhcy arc politically and morally dcsirablc, making cconomic planning an insuumcnt of social planning nlhcx ihan a victim of ecological planning. 
